LEFT AND RIGHT

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SLAVERY

THE COMMUNIST BOGEY

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A Journal Of Libertarian Thought

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The Economics Of SLAVERY

The Political Economy of Slavery by Eugene D. Genovese. Pantheon Books, New York (1965) 304 pp. $6.95.

The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture by David Brion Davis. Cornell University Press (1966) 505 pp. $10.00.

*By Gordon Tullock**

The editor, when he asked me to review these books, said I could write as much as I wished. This was probably unwise of him since I have been working intermittently on the economics of slavery for some time, and have never before had an opportunity to put my conclusions in writing.[1] Nevertheless, I intend to take advantage

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1. My interest and knowledge were both greatly expanded by conversations with Dr. John Moes. Since Dr. Moes is currently on a UN mission in Africa, he cannot be blamed for anything in this article, but many of its insights are due to him. He has published three excellent discussions of the subject: "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South. Another Comment", Journal of Political Economy, April 1960, 183; "Comment", Aspects of Labor Economics, National Bureau for Economic Research -- Princeton University Press (1962), 247; and "The Absorption of Capital in Slave Labor in in the Ante Bellum South and Economic Growth", American Journal of Economics and Sociology (October 1961), 535.

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of his generosity and discuss the economic theory of slavery as a necessary background to any understanding of these books. I should like to begin, however, by restricting my discussion to those examples of slavery in which the slaves formed a sizeable part of the labor force. Serfdom and slavery in situations where slaves are uncommon, will be omitted, not because they are uninteresting, but simply to avoid putting too much strain on the generosity of the editor.

With these limitations, confining our attention to large scale slavery, we find that it is historically quite a rare phenomenon. There seem to be only two significant examples: the Greek-Roman classical world and the system which grew up on the East Coast of the Americas from Brazil to Virginia.[2] This is in spite of the fact that slavery has been a minor feature in very many places and times. The legal and social institutions for slavery have been quite common historically, but only twice have they been utilized on a major scale for a significant period of time.[3] This sharp limitation on large scale slavery would seem to indicate that there are natural economic forces tending to prevent or eliminate it, and that the two major examples are cases where some special circumstance permitted the development of an institution which under normal conditions would be non-viable. It will be one of the objects of this essay to indicate that this is in fact the case.

First, however, let us examine the functioning of a large scale system of slavery. The first special characteristic

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2. Stalin's slave labor camps might be considered a third, and it was, in fact, an interest in whether they were economically profitable to the Soviet State which first turned my attention to the problem of slavery. On careful examination, however, it appears that there are clear distinctions between the Stalin labor camp system (and Hitler's smaller scale experiment with the same system) and private slavery. As a single example, the death rate in the camps was much higher than any private master who had to pay for the purchase of replacements would permit.
3. "Major" and "significant" are somewhat hard to define, and it is obvious that I am using essentially arbitrary criteria. There is, however, a clear distinction between the situation where slavery is confined to a few servants in wealthy households and where slaves do much of the hard work in the society. Most cases fall in one or the other classifications quite readily, but there are marginal cases. Developments in Italy toward the end of the Middle Ages would be an example.

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of such a system is that labor may be obtained either by hiring it in the usual way, or by purchasing it. The man setting up some sort of enterprise may decide to staff it with slaves instead of employees. If he decides on slaves, then he will make an initial capital investment when he purchases them, which must be amortized over the life of the investment. [4] Thus the slave owner will spend a certain amount on the sustenance of his slaves, and he can only make a profit on his investment if this amount is enough less than the wages he would have to pay free labor to do the same work so that he can cover the costs of his original capital investment. Since slave labor is notoriously inefficient, this means that the difference between the sustenance given a slave and the current wage rate must be substantial.

Expectations of this differential, together with expected mortality and the prevailing interest rate will determine the prices paid for slaves. There has been much ink spilled on the question of whether southern slavery was profitable. Most of the contributors to this controversy take the price of slaves as fixed and try to work out the return. In the actual historic situation, the prices were not fixed, being dependent upon estimates of the profitability of one investment (slaves) as against another (say, improved machinery). Presumably investments in slaves were as profitable or unprofitable as investments in other types of capital. Some people no doubt made their fortunes, others lost their shirt, and the majority did reasonably well, just as in any other kind of investment. The entrepreneurs, moving their personal abilities and the capital they controlled from activities in which slaves were used to those in which they were not, or vice versa, in continual search for profit, kept the returns on all resources reasonably similar.

The system, then, brought in no great profit for anyone. The slave owner, the slave producer, and the owners of other resources all simply got the normal returns. The slave, on the other hand, suffered a very great loss. Thus we see a system which inflicted terrible penalties on one part of the population without any compensating gains to others. The institution clearly imposes a large net cost on society as a whole. Its total cost, however, is not measured only by the injury inflicted on the slave. A slave would have the strongest possible motive to revolt, kill

4. If the slave-master takes good care of his slaves, then they may reproduce themselves or even grow in number. In this case he must get only the interest on the investment, not replacement costs.

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his master, or run away. This meant that the continuance of the slave system required a very sizeable expenditure on "security" against the slaves. These costs were largely born by the non-slaveholding free population. If the costs of the Roman slave wars or the "county patrollers" who kept the slaves in order in the old South, had fallen exclusively on the slave holders, it is dubious that the system could have survived. Instead, these costs were largely put upon the free population by some form of conscription, like the legal requirement of serving in the legions or the county patrol. As George Fitzhugh said, "The poor . . . constitute our militia and our police. They protect men in possession of property, as in other countries; and do much more, they secure men in possession of a kind of property which they could not hold a day but for the supervision and protection of the poor." [5]

The whole society might be warped by the necessity of providing security against the slaves. Again, this cost was not borne exclusively by the slave-holders. Further, in the American south the slaves were all negroes and all whites were free men. Under these circumstances the color of a man's skin, not an easily hidden characteristic, was fairly good evidence of whether he was or was not a runaway slave. The development of concentrations of negroes who were free would have provided shelter for runaways. Hence the continual (albeit, ineffectual) efforts of southern legislators to prevent development of a significant free population of negroes. If the free negroes in an area were so numerous that the police officers would not know all of them by sight, then the detection of runaways would have been much more difficult. Similarly, concentrations of negroes in cities raised a very real danger of slave revolts. Hence southern cities were not as interested in growth as were their northern counterparts.

But to return to the theory of slavery, we have so far said nothing about the origin of the slaves. They can, logically be obtained in two ways, by raising them or by capture. Raising a slave is an expensive process and will

5. Quoted in Genovese, p. 230. Although his book is entitled The Political Economy of Slavery, this is almost the only place where the vital problem of the security of a slave system is mentioned by Genovese. Davis' book, in contrast, is an intellectual history, but it discusses the problem frequently. This is only one of the many cases where Davis shows greater penetration than Genovese.

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be undertaken only if the price at which slaves are selling will repay the investment of capital over a period of 15 or so years for each slave "produced." If the slaves are captured, on the other hand, they may be relatively cheap. In the Greek and Roman world a large part of the slave population were obtained as a sort of by-product of the wars which were a continual preoccupation of that society. The slaves exported from Africa, to the United States only before 1806, but to Brazil as late as 1870, were similarly the result of capture or were "taxed" by the African kings. In either case the cost of "raising" the slave was not born by the enterprise which first put him on the market, and the slave could be profitably sold at much less than if he had been raised by his first owner.

The low price of slaves who had been captured rather than raised meant that they could be treated quite differently from the more expensive slaves who were raised. They could be given standards of sustenance which were not likely to keep them alive very long, be over-worked, and be subject to disciplinary measures which might lead to death.[6] It would appear that the slaves imported from Africa to the Caribbean sugar plantations or to Brazil had a life expectancy of about 5 years. As far as we can tell, during the parts of Roman history in which frequent wars led to frequent captures of slaves, the treatment and life expectancy were rather similar. When the supply of captured slaves was cut off, by periods of peace in Rome or by legal bans on importation to the Caribbean and the United States, drastic changes in the treatment of the slaves occurred. The slaves were now much more valuable and had to be treated in a way which took that into account. Standards of sustenance were raised and less barbaric methods were used in discipline. The fact that the only two major cases of significant economic utilization of slaves began during the period of the worst Roman wars, and when slaves could be freely captured in Africa, is at least some evidence that the system is only viable when captured slaves are available.

The African kings who provided most of the slaves for the two Americas operated under essentially competitive conditions. Each one would, as long as his power lasted, have control of his operating area and a strip of coast, but the slave ships could easily go somewhere else if he put his prices above those of his royal competitors. Thus there is

6. In the days before the discovery of germs, gangrene was an omnipresent danger whenever the skin was broken.

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no reason to believe that the prices at which slaves were sold on the African Coast produced much pure profit for the "producers." Shipping the slaves to their destination in the Americas was also a competitive enterprise, and there is no reason to believe that the ship owners of Boston, Bristol, or Lisbon got any greater return on these runs than on their ships carrying ordinary cargo across the North Atlantic. It is a sobering thought that this trade which inflicted such extraordinary suffering on the blacks who were seized by force and shipped across the Atlantic under appalling conditions, produced no more than ordinary profits for the enterprises involved. Once again we have an example where the institution of slavery inflicted great harm without providing any compensating great gains.

One topic remains in our hasty survey of the economics of slavery, manumission. Freeing a slave is normally treated as an act of grace on the part of the master, and deemed a morally meritorious act. Although I would not like to deny the existence of such acts of manumission, the fact remains that historically manumission has more often taken the form of a mutally profitable arrangement between the slave and his master. As has been noted, slaves are not normally very efficient workers. The reasons for this have to do with the lack of incentives for good work when their master will get most of the benefit of their labor. The empirical evidence seems clear that it is frequently possible to get as much, perhaps more, labor from a slave as from a free man if the slave is given the reward of eventual freedom for his extra work. The institutional arrangements for permitting the slave to "purchase" himself from his master are extremely various,[7] but there is one simple and straightforward method which can do as an example. Suppose that the return that a slave owner may expect from a slave after having paid for his sustenance (but not capital costs) is $.50. The slave "rents" himself from his master for $.55 and seeks employment from someone else. In this other employment he will work as hard or harder than a free man and can make $.90 per day over his sustenance. He saves the $.45 and eventually purchases himself from his master. Both master and slave have benefited from the bargain, and the shortage of major slave systems in history

7. John Moes points out that the slave will normally be willing to pay more for his freedom than his market value to another slave owner. As he, rather grimly put it, the slave will pay a higher price because he has a sentimental attachment to his own body.

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comes simply from the fact that slaves and masters normally, perhaps only after a generation or two, see this opportunity.

The basic reason for the failure of this type of "sale" of the slave to himself in the guise of manumission to develop in the ante-bellum South would appear to be the stringent and steadily growing legal restrictions on manumission. There was also considerable social pressure against manumission, and in the last years before the Civil War a reaction to abolitionist propaganda developed into strong arguments that slavery was somehow a superior form of civilization. The explanation for these developments is fairly simple. The individual slaveholder would have been better off if he could have made a deal with his slaves to sell them their freedom. Large numbers of free negroes, however, would have endangered the "property rights" of the slaveholders in those that were still fully or partially owned. Thus the slaveholders had a motive collectively to favor laws against manumission in spite of the fact that each one would have benefited from permission to manumit his own slave if he were the only one given such permission. The long run outcome of this tension between the individual and collective interests of the slave owners cannot now be known. From 1806 when importation of slaves was forbidden to 1860 was only 54 years, or considerably less than the threescore years and ten which the Bible gives as a normal life span. In economic terms this was not long enough to bring the system even near to full equilibrium. If we add on the numerous sociological factors, adjustment would have been even more delayed. Thus the possibility that slavery would have eliminated itself remains an open one.

Having completed my desperately brief survey of the economic problems of slavery, I can now turn to the books which I am to review. Putting my opinion briefly, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture is an excellent discussion of a relatively unimportant subject, and The Political Economy of Slavery is a poor book on a subject of considerable significance. From the title of Davis's book, it might seem that he is dealing with an even broader subject than Genovese, but his real field is intellectual history, and the subtitle of his book indicates that it is almost entirely concerned with developments before 1770. Thus it is a review of the literature in western languages on slavery. Greek and Roman experience is largely ruled out of consideration as too early to be part of western culture, and the account begins with medieval efforts to

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apply the Roman law of slavery to quite different institutions. Although the Latin and early French sources are explored for late medieval work on the subject, and the Spanish and Portuguese experience in the New World is touched on, the main interests of Dr. Davis are obviously concentrated on literature in English and the institutions of the English speaking world. Some important French writers of the Enlightenment are discussed, but they probably had as much effect on English thought as on French. Granted this rather narrow subject, Dr. Davis's scholarship is impeccable.

The limitation on The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, put in its simplest possible form, is that there wasn't much literature on the problem of slavery in English before 1770. Granted Dr. Davis's obvious talents, I was led to wonder at his devoting so much energy and skill to the cultivation of such barren ground. The obvious conclusion is that he is in process of writing a multi-volume history of thought on the problem of American slavery, and that this is a sort of introductory volume giving the historical background. If my hypothesis is correct, then the later volumes should be very good. Dr. Davis is an excellent intellectual historian, and given a broader scope, he should produce highly important work. I should not, however, like to leave my discussion of The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture on an entirely negative note. It is very well written, and I enjoyed reading it. It cannot be listed as "indispensable" but it surely is interesting.

Dr. Davis seems to know little about economics, and the writers he is studying, naturally, knew nothing which we would now recognize by that name. Nevertheless, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture is economically a better book than The Political Economy of Slavery. The ignorance of Dr. Davis and the sources upon which he draws is considerably better than the systematic error of Dr. Genovese. A good many of the people quoted by Dr. Davis were practical men with a great deal of experience with the "peculiar institution." Dr. Davis, who has no particular ax to grind, merely reports their opinions, and they are frequently of considerable economic interest. Dr. Genovese, on the other hand, is unfortunately a religious man. The "truth" was revealed to him before he began his research, and he tortures his material until it fits the Gospel According to St. Marx. Unfortunately, too, Dr. Genovese does not show much evidence of even having studied Marx very carefully. Marxism today appears to be in

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dissolution.[8] Dr. Genovese's presentation is most accurately described as symptomatic of that dissolution rather than as representing the thought of Karl Marx. In its orthodox version Marxism had a certain degree of logical cohesion which is lacking in The Political Economy of Slavery. Dr. Genovese has a sort of emotional attitude which resembles that of Marx and knows a few Marxist slogans and tags, but he shows no sign of having studied the higher reaches of Marxist thought.

The the great defect of Genovese's book is not its ideological outlook but its technical inadequacy. In the introduction he says that "the book falls within Gonzalez Prada's definition of Sociology--the art of saying old things in new ways and the science of affirming contradictions." The contradictions affirmed are not few, and neither are other types of errors as well. I cannot list all of the errors in The Political Economy of Slavery in the space of even a review article. But one example, Genovese's discussion of the diet of the slaves, illustrates a clear-cut contradiction as well as the author's unfortunate methods of interpreting data.

Theoretically, one would expect that the slave owners would approach the diet of their slaves in much the same way that the owners of draft horses decided what and how much to feed their animals. The objective is to keep the "stock" healthy enough to do heavy labor at a minimum cost.[9] This, we would expect, would lead to a diet much like that of the present-day Chinese peasant: coarse grains and potatoes supplemented by a fair amount of leafy vegetables and members of the bean family. We would expect very little meat in the diet because it is expensive.

But, in fact, the slave diet went in heavily for meat,

8. It may be that the dissolution is not the first step toward the total elimination of this powerful religion, but merely a breaking away of the talmudic encrustation of the true scribes and pharisees of the Second and Third Internationals. Such a development is not uncommon in the history of other religions. My personal opinion is that the disintegration which we now see is more fundamental, however, and I doubt that Marxism will survive the century as a living faith.
9. This is a slight over-simplification. Strictly, the owner would attempt to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of labor services expected to be received from the slave and his progeny minus the present discounted value of the food to be provided.

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primarily pork or pork products with very little in the way of vegetables.(45) Dr. Genovese gives a figure of 3 1/2 pounds of bacon per head per week. This clearly is not a minimum cost diet. The simplest explanation would appear to be ignorance of dietetic principles on the part of the slave owners. Modern research has taught us a great deal since 1860. Looked at from the perspective of our present day knowledge, everyone, free and slave, ate too little in the way of vegetables, salads and fruits in the 19th century. Dr. Genovese, however, doesn't mention this possible explanation, and explains the phenomenon on the grounds that the planters were trying to keep down their expenses. Surely less pork and more vegetables would have produced better nutrition at a lower cost.

Dr. Genovese also appears to think that the slave owners actually did not feed their slaves enough to keep them in good health. I say "appears" because his discussion on the point is hard to follow. Thus: "There is nothing surprising in the slave's appearance of good health: his diet was well suited to guarantee the appearance of good health and to provide the fuel to keep him going in the fields, but it was not sufficient to ensure either sound bodies or the stamina necessary for sustained labor." (45) In the first place, this implies that the work of the field hand on a cotton plantation was fairly easy--surely the reverse of the truth. And secondly, if he does affirm that the slaves were underfed, the motives that would lead the slave owners to keep their "stock" in less than optimum working condition would seem to bear investigation. The only light I was able to obtain on the question was a vague feeling that Dr. Genovese thought this condition was the result of the economic system. But no detailed mechanism connecting the economics of slavery with the purported underfeeding of the slaves is presented. Dr. Genovese doesn't even seem to realize that this is a problem.

As another example of Dr. Genovese's peculiar standards of logical coherence: "The term 'slavery' applied to West African societies could easily mislead us, for the slaves held therein functioned in the economy without special disadvantage. Apart from the gloomy possiblity of ritual execution, the worst a slave suffered was to have to endure as a pariah . . ." Or: "an acceptable general theory of the social effects of soil exhaustion must be sufficiently flexible to account for the requirements of different historical epochs. The rise of capitalism requires a theory that includes the inability of the soil to recover sufficient productivity to maintain a competitive position." (88) This would appear

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to make any theory of the rise of capitalism in England, Japan, or many other countries impossible. And, finally, Genovese says: "The ideological barriers to substantial planter investments (in industry) remained formidable, for investments in land and slaves brought high status, whereas investments in industry did not, and those requiring the sale of surplus slaves might even bring social disapproval." (189) This statement is "supported" by a footnote in which Jefferson Davis is reported to have "complained bitterly that many millions of dollars in private capital had been invested in blockade running, but very little money had been devoted to manufacturing." (213-214)[10]

As my final example of Genovese's errors, I turn to a major misunderstanding of general economic principles. The ante-bellum South was, of course, a specialized producer of cotton for export and the deep involvement in foreign trade that this brought with it seems to disturb Dr. Genovese. Again and again he reports that something was imported (or exported) and treats this as evidence of southern economic weakness. It is hard to see exactly what he thinks is wrong with foreign trade, but clearly something is. "The South's dependence on the export trade, in contradiction to the North's primary reliance on its home market, indicates not merely a social division of labor, but the economic exploitation of the exporting South." (160) His treatment of other economic issues is equally obtuse.

But these are only a few examples of Dr. Genovese's methods, drawn more or less at random from the book. He is careless with facts, crabbed in his interpretations, and totally ignorant of economic theory.

In the first footnote to the introduction of his book Geno-

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10. Genovese's sloppy standards of documentation are illustrated also by his stating in the preface that six of the studies comprising the book appeared previously in journals, "as noted in the acknowledgments", whereas in the acknowledgments we find only four articles listed. Such errors are minor, but they are scattered thickly throughout the book. Traditionally, economic historians have been particularly careful in their use of statistical data. Recently, the younger scholars have been introducing advanced statistical techniques into the field. Dr. Genovese lacks both the scientific tools of the younger generation and the scrupulous care of the older.

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vese says: "The generalizations presented in this first study require considerable elaboration and defense, which the following studies only begin to offer." (10) This is one sentence from the book with which I wholeheartedly agree. Surely the present state of his work is more apt to lead to skepticism than to conviction. Whether he will, in future works, successfully defend his "generalizations" is more doubtful. I would suggest that instead of "elaborating", he reconsider them.

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Science And Society

The Organization of Inquiry by Gordon Tullock. Duke University Press, 1966.

By Frederick C. Kreiling*

Do we now have the Third Culture that C. P. Snow saw coming to life? It would appear so. A good deal of work is currently being produced by a mixed group of scholars and intellectuals who are concerned with the problems of science and civilization and anxious to remedy the isolation and intellectual fragmentation that have arisen from intense specialization. Professor Tullock's absorbing book falls into this general category. More specifically, he is concerned with science as a social system, with the socio-economic implications of science and with the behavior of the scientific community.

Why do men inquire, he asks, and comes to the hardly surprising conclusion that some men inquire because they are genuinely curious, others because they are induced to do so by the gains that will accrue to them. Fair enough, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The really crucial discoveries, from which science takes its inner life, seem to require such talent and depth of motivation that no general theory can really account for them. What was it that impelled Newton? Hope for fame? Neurosis? Fortunate historical circumstance? It is very hard to say. All three, and much more besides. Indeed, scholars have only within the last decade begun to describe his achievement with the degree of precision it deserves and there are probably not more than a dozen men in the whole world who really understand the Principia in its innermost depths. Before we can have a good theory of scientific

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creativity we must know more about particular scientists and the conditions under which they lived and worked.

The vision of the unity of the sciences goes back to Aristotle. It was discussed at length during the seventeenth century especially by Leibniz. It is a beautiful and reassuring vision, but it is not quite, as Mr. Tullock believes, an accepted fact on which we can rely. Each science deals with separate categories of facts that are treated experimentally or observationally by persons who know the accepted theories and whose special skills have been sharpened by constant practice. The combined set of theories, applications, instruments and practices, that Thomas S. Kuhn has aptly called the paradigm of a science, is shared by a group of adherents. Under normal conditions they proceed to work on more detailed and refined questions which all refer to the general paradigm as given. At no point in history, least of all today, have the set of paradigms in existence taken together been entirely consistent. Before we can talk meaningfully of science as a unity, we should have to develope a language of the utmost precision that would, as Leibniz hoped, enable us, for example, to speak of both physics and psychology in consistent terms. We should, in brief, require a science of science.

To his credit, the author is keenly aware of the pitfalls in writing about science. He knows very well that there is more myth than truth in what is commonly held to be the theory of induction. Yet he cannot resist, albeit apologetically, spending a chapter on it. He correctly points out that human beings habitually make patterns out of bits of available information, and that this process, extended and refined, is probably the means by which theories are related to sets of facts. But he tends to neglect the historical dimension, in particular the fact that the researcher's attention is conditioned by the sheer existence of certain fields of inquiry and of preferred modes of investigation at any given time. Suppose, let us say, that during the seventeenth century a great epidemic attacked Western Europe, a disease that had the effect of altering the perception of Europeans so that they focused on one set of phenomena to the exclusion of others and that they proceeded to examine the preferred set. Later researchers would certainly be disposed to continue in the chosen areas, but at the price of neglecting equally or even more important ones. Scientists generally investigate classes of facts that have previously been established as significant. There is nothing, in principle, that cannot be examined scientifically, but the existence of particular scientific

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fields has been determined in large part by historical situations.

Does the law of diminishing returns apply to science? A good number of writers, including the author of this work, think that it does. They share among other things the view that the degree of specialization may well be higher than optimal at least in traditional fields, and there is a good deal of evidence to support their contention. Indeed, it is even possible, as Stephen Toulmin has suggested, that the rate of increase in science as a whole is declining. No growth curve in nature ever continues at a constant rate.

As science claims an increasing share of the Federal budget its costs become a matter of concern, although they are minute in comparison with those of the war. More serious are the effects of support on science itself. The more the scientist depends on Federal grants, the more he is obliged to "justify" his work to government agencies that tend to measure "success" by results that can be put into immediate use. The administrator inevitably begins to think of the planning of research. Mr. Tullock is, (rightly, I think) against excessive planning in the sciences, for the historical record clearly shows that individual creativity has been by far the most significant source of innovation, whether in pure or applied fields. However, when one contemplates the effects of the untrammed expansion of certain kinds of technology, one is not inclined to trust Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' as the best means of control.

We cannot forget, as Mr. Tullock tends to, that business as usual for the automobile industry will not help the traffic problems of the cities, which could be ameliorated at least by the use of much smaller vehicles, nor that costly moon shots may not be as important in the long run as efforts to resolve the present ecologic crisis.

Sir Karl R. Popper, whose thought provided the philosophical inspiration for this work, is justly celebrated as one of the greatest living philosophers of science. He has stressed, among many other things, that freedom of inquiry is imperative for the growth of science; that many of the standard modes of explaining science mislead by giving the impression that scientific truth is absolute; and that one of the most important features of scientific procedure is that it requires hypotheses to be cast into

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a form in which they not only can be verified, but more significantly, proved wrong.

I share with Popper and Tullock the liberal view that science has been a potent force for individual freedom in the past. But doubts arise for the present and future at the realization that so much scientific activity in recent years has been shrouded in secrecy or held as the special province of experts who brook no disagreement except from their colleagues. One wonders what John Stuart Mill would have thought of the words of one astute and humane observer of both science and the establishment who writes that: "unfortunately, the constraints of secrecy, although they disturb the comparative judgment, do not disturb the scientific process. In more liberal days, in the days of Rutherford's Cambridge, Bohr's Copenhagen, Franck's Gottingen, scientists tended to assume, as an optimistic act of faith, as something which ought to be true because it made life sweeter, that science could only flourish in the free air. I wish it were so. I think that everyone who has ever witnessed secret science and secret choices wishes it were so. But nearly all the evidence is dead against it. Science needs discussion, yes; it needs the criticism of other scientists; but that can be made to exist, and of course has been made to exist, in the most secret projects. Scientists have worked, apparently happily, and certainly effectively, in conditions which would have been thought the negation of science by the great free minded practitioners. But the secret, the closed, the climate which to earlier scientists would have been morally intolerable, soon becomes easy to tolerate. I even doubt whether, if one could compare the rate of advance in one of the secret sciences with one of those which is still open to the world, there would be any significant difference. It is a pity." (C. P. Snow, Science and Government, New York 1962, p. 68) We must at least not overestimate the liberating effects of science in the contemporary world. There can be no modern industrial nation without it and its potentialities for improving the lot of all mankind are immense, but the possibility of secret science as a medium of political control calls up the nightmare of the super-state armed with electronic listening devices and computerized dossiers on every citizen.

Mr. Tullock believes that the social sciences are decidedly "backward" because they are incapable of exact prediction. Worse, he thinks practitioners in those fields are mainly of the "induced" variety, rather than persons with a sustaining natural curiosity, and, as an economist,

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he is unhappy to be classed among them. The belief in the alleged inferiority of the social sciences, which he also shares with Popper, arises, I believe, from the unfortunate practice of comparing them with physics. It is extremely unlikely, perhaps even undesirable, that anything as precise as physics will ever be derived from social science, and in my view, it is a tactical error for social scientists to worry so intensely about exact measurement to the exclusion of more profitable concerns. This is especially true at a time when previous physical models of the universe have undergone such profound transformations. Biology, particularly evolutionary studies, and above all ecology are probably more useful models. In these sciences, to which neither Popper nor Tullock have devoted much attention, the age-old quest for an irreducible essence has been accompanied by great interest in interactive processes, and it is precisely this type of study which is more useful in understanding social or political issues. Furthermore, the motivation of the best social scientists has been in no way inferior to that of the best natural scientists. (Every field has its modest contributors, perennial journeymen and so on; they help provide the social niche in which the best minds can function.) The issues social scientists confront are really much more difficult. Even Max Planck confessed himself terrified at the perplexities of economics and turned back with relief to the relative simplicity of physics.

On the whole Professor Tullock has written a provocative and interesting work which should prove very useful as an introduction to the problems of science in the matrix of modern culture.

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The Communist As Bogey-Man

The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist Cadre by Frank S. Meyer. Harcourt, Brace, and World, New York, 1967. Paper. Originally published in hard cover in 1961.

By Murray N. Rothbard

Frank S. Meyer is by far the most intelligent, as well as the most libertarian-inclined, of the National Review stable of editors and staff. Of all the National Review editors and contributors, for example, Meyer is the only one to lend his name to the recently organized Council for a Volunteer Military, which calls for abolition of the draft (and even though Meyer is not unequivocally against the draft for all times and places.) But, tragically, Meyer is also, of the war-mongering crew of intellectuals on the Right, perhaps the most frankly and apocalyptically war-mongering of them all (with the possible exception of L. Brent Bozell.) Meyer's libertarian inclinations are fatally warped by his all-consuming desire to incarcerate and incinerate all Communists, wherever they may be. Meyer is, therefore, an interesting example in microcosm of the swamping of any libertarian instincts on the current Right-wing by an all-pervading passion for the Great Crusade to exterminate Communists everywhere.

Meyer is also a microcosm of the Right in that he is a former leading member of the Communist Party of the United States--a fact clearly related to his passion for destroying his former comrades. In fact, Meyer was one of the highest ranking members of the C. P., having been a party member for over a decade, a member of the national

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committee of the CPUSA, and head of the Workers' School, the Communist training school in Chicago second in rank only to the famous Jefferson School in New York. While not as publicly well known as such defectors from the Communist Party as Louis Budenz, Meyer apparently outranked them all in the Communist cadre. During the Smith Act and other similar trials, Meyer appeared as expert witness for the prosecution on Communist theory; and this book was the fruit of his experience as organizer and a leading member of the "Communist cadre." When the book appeared, in 1961, it was uniformly lauded in the scholarly journals, where the reviewers buried their hostility to conservatism in the interests of the common anti-Communist cause, while the left-wing journals ignored the book altogether. It is very possible, therefore, that this is the first unfavorable review of the Meyer book--now reissued unaltered in paper-back--to see publication.

Americans were bombarded, throughout the nineteenth century, by "confessional" literature --by tracts and volumes by defectors and renegades from various groups and causes--purporting to expose and decry the all-pervading sins and horrors of their former colleagues. The land abounded with tracts carrying such titles as: "I Fled From a Nunnery"; "The International Catholic Conspiracy Exposed!" "The Horrible Secrets of Freemasonry", etc. Americans, one would suppose, had learned to take this literature with a liberal dose of salt, and had learned not to take these fulminations very seriously. The problem with this literature is not simply the outright lies and fabrications; the problem is the deeper one of a total loss of perspective that leads the defector, in guilt at his former actions as well as resentment against his former colleagues for not seeing the light, to blow up unpleasant incidents into a uniquely diabolic movement that needs to be exposed, reviled, and universally condemned.

Let us take, for example, the hypothetical case of a man who spends a decade or two of his life as an active and leading battler for some cause--say, vegetarianism. Then, after this length of time, he becomes converted to an opposite position: say, to be extreme, that vegetables are a positive evil and that one should eat virtually nothing but meat. Think of the enormous weight of guilt that this man now feels; a decade or more of the best years of his life, he now believes, had been spent in promoting what he now believes to be a great and monstrous evil, and in undermining what he now believes to be a positive good.

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Is it any wonder that he tends to go off half-cocked on the problem, denouncing both his former beliefs and the purveyors of them as the ultimate evil, attacking the "international vegetarian conspiracy" which must either be destroyed or it will conquer the innocent meat-eating and meat-needing world? It would take much greater fortitude, of course, for our ex-vegetarian to say: "well, vegetarianism is relatively unimportant, and those decades were really a big waste of time" and then to forget about the whole affair. It is, instead, the easier course to do the opposite and thus to justify still, if not the goals of one's lost decades, then at least the overriding importance of those years.

Generations of experience, then, with this kind of confessional literature had supposedly toughened Americans against taking it too seriously; but all this experience went by the board with the advent of the Cold War. Every lurid "I Was A Communist" horror tale was rushed into print to a national acclaim that would have done credit to the reception of a book "exposing" the "international" Jesuit order in the Georgia backcountry of forty years ago. Being an intellectual, Meyer did not publish the usual ex-Communist flim-flam of personal memoirs and denunciations; instead, he was the only ex-Communist to build out of his experience a general theory of the Communist training of their hard-core members: of the forging of "Bolshevik man." But while very different in content from the usual ex-Communist confessional, critical analysis reveals the Meyer work to be suffering from the same basic stigmata: the blowing up of events and actions common to many groups into a monstrous and diabolic pattern of actions unique to the group from which the author had traveled. Specifically, Meyer points with horror to a pattern of action of the Communist cadre which is, in actuality, common to almost all modern organizations. His uniquely diabolic and re-moulded Bolshevik Men turn out to be, on further inspection, simply Organization Men, with the sins of all Organization Men everywhere.

The central thesis of the Meyer book, then, is the unique diabolism of the Communist movement and of the Communist cadre as persons. We read time and again of the "profoundly different character of Communist consciousness---different from anything with which we are acquainted" (4); "for the Communist is different. He thinks differently. Reality looks different to him." (4) The personality of the Communist, says Meyer, is totally transformed, transformed by the "training process that moulds the Communist cadre."

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He becomes a new man--a "Bolshevik"--and this new type is the same throughout the world Communist movement, regardless of the country involved. (This transcendence of any national or cultural boundaries is important for Meyer to establish, else he would have to admit that not all Communists are uniquely diabolic "Bolshevik" types.) As a result of this training, he declares, "they acquire a strength and confidence which, like the fearful evil they bring into being, can only be described as Luciferian." (71) "Luciferian" is indeed the operative word, for the thesis of Meyer's book is the radical difference between Communists and all other men, a difference that makes them non-human, that makes them in effect agents of the Devil--all-cunning, almost always successful in the pursuit of their evil ends--and against whom force and violence are called upon by Meyer to extirpate root and branch: "Against this vision of . . . Communist man, there is no recourse in compromise, reasonableness, peaceful co-existence . . . Communist man poses two stark alternatives for us: victory or defeat" (171)---kill or be killed, except, of course that modern weapons are such that both are likely to occur together--a highly important fact that Meyer somehow neglects to mention.

What, then, of Meyer's central contention of a uniquely Satanic Communist organization and training? The big problem is that all of the characteristics he mentions can be found in almost any organization of dedicated men, regardless of what that dedication happens to be. Thus, the major feature of the "Bolshevik" is his absolute dedication and loyalty to the decisions of the Communist Party, a Party which takes on the right to run the lives of its members for its own benefit. And yet, this phenomenon unfortunately exists in all sorts of organizations. Much of this process occurs, for example, in the typical corporate Organization Man of our time. Take, for example, the rising young junior or middle-rank executive at GM or IBM. He begins as an ordinary quasi-independent human being, an individual. Then, as he works and rises up the ranks of the IBM "cadre", his values and therefore his personality begin to be moulded, to be transformed into the typical Organization Man. He begins to believe that his own personal tastes and values and pursuits must be subordinated to an over-arching "loyalty to the company." An eccentric hobby is given up as too outre for the company "image"; any tendency to obesity is reprimanded and stamped out by his friendly company bosses; even the choice of a wife is thoroughly checked and corrected by the criterion of whether or not she fits into the company

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executive mould. Yet Mr. Meyer seems to believe that only the Communist Party has presumed to dictate the private lives of its members!

This phenomenon of re-moulding and the reducing of the member of an organization to a "loyal" cipher is particularly marked in organizations that Meyer undoubtedly admires: the CIA, Army Intelligence, or the FBI. Meyer expresses shock that the Communist, through processes of training, holds the good of the Party above the good of his family, his friends, his private life, or even himself. But what of the "good CIA man"? Is he not taught the same thing and moulded in the same way? Is he not taught to lie, to cheat, even to kill, if the "interests of his country"--as interpreted of course by his government bosses--so demand? Isn't he taught to disregard the interests of himself or his family, if they conflict with these "larger" interests? Is he not taught to keep secrets from his own family, to lie to them for his "country's sake?" How does all this differ from Meyer's picture of the cadre Communist? At one or two points, Meyer comes close to this truth by describing the Communist as a kind of soldier in the ranks; granted, but what then of all the other soldiers of this world? What of the American soldier? If Meyer should reply that the ends of the two are different, then this would concede the destruction of the central thesis of his book, for it is not his end (socialism) but his means and his personality and his type of organization that make him, for Frank Meyer, "Luciferian." It is the latter--the Communist's means and organization--that is supposed to make peaceful coexistence with him impossible. For if socialist goals were the distinctively Luciferian feature, then whole hordes of people--including Norman Thomas and Sidney Hook and perhaps even Walter Reuther and the ADA would, according to Meyer, have to be exterminated.

If, then, the Communist is taught that his end--the good of the Party as a whole--justifies any means to attain it, and this is his Luciferian quality--then so is taught the American or British or German soldier, so is the intelligence officer---and so, after all, is every politician. For are we not told, again and again, that the State and its politicians (regardless of what State or what party they belong to) cannot be bound by the ordinary rules of individual and social morality? Are we not told, again and again, that overriding "reasons of State" compel them to lie, cheat, kill, for the sake of the "national interest"? Every State, every government, every politician, follows such a path; how then does this differ from the Communist?

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The objection might be raised: If we say that Communists are not uniquely monsters, how can they bring themselves to justify such brutalities as Soviet slave labor camps, as the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, etc? Don't such justifications make the Communists diabolic and especially inhuman--as Meyer claims, and as he bolsters his claim with his and Whittaker Chambers' depictions of the "crises" faced by Communists as they wrestle with the problem of the "screams in the night"--of those butchered by the Soviet and other Communist governments.

Well, let us investigate this "screams in the night" problem. Here again, it will become clear that such justification by Communists is not only not unique, but is unfortunately almost universal, and is engaged in by the supporters of all States, everywhere and at all times. For example, Harry S. Truman and his cohorts deliberately and wantonly annihilated hundreds of thousands of innocent Japanese civilians, including women and children, in A-bomb blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How many Americans have listened to their screams in the night? Have Meyer or Chambers? How many Americans have failed to "justify" --in the name of the "national interest" or whatever-- this monstrous act? How many "cadre Americans"---either in the government or out---jumped off the American-State bandwagon, because of this act? How many have even expressed remorse or indignation? And the same can be said of countless American actions, including the bombing of hundreds of thousands of German refugees at Dresden, the sending of hundreds of thousands of refugees back to the Soviet zone of Germany, etc. and down to the current genocidal napalming of the innocent peasantry of South and North Vietnam. Justifications, rationalizations, for butchery and mass murder have been served up by every State and cheerfully adopted by the overwhelming majority of their citizens. One amusingly ironic example from U. S. annals: the U. S. went to war against Spain in 1898 ostensibly to free the Cuban people from the activities of such as "Butcher Weyler", the Spanish general who inaugurated the "modern" policy of concentration camps for the native civilian population. Yet, a short time later, and in direct consequence of our conquest of the Phillipines in the self-same war, the American Army used the exact same tactics--to which were added the burning of native villages, along with all of their inhabitants-- against the Filipinos who were fighting for their independence against our occupying forces. Who in America remonstrated? Who jumped off the cadre-American bandwagon?

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Apart from its concerte problems, the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution needed no special justification by Communists; for every State in history, with no exception, has ruthlessly fought to suppress every revolution against its rule. The U. S. Army ruthlessly suppressed rioters and rebels a few years ago in the U. S. colony of Okinawa. On a larger scale, the British, in their ruthless war of suppression against Malayan revolutionaries fighting for their independence, razed and burned whole villages to the ground, using the very principle of "collective guilt" for which Americans and British had self-righteously denounced the Nazis at Lidice. Who protested in the West? Did Frank Meyer? On the contrary: for Meyer himself has an enormous number of anti-Communist-created "screams in the night" to account for and justify before the bar of morality. Meyer, for example, along with his fellow editors of National Review, supported the French war to suppress the Algerian national revolution, a war in which the French used every barbarism of which the Soviet government can be accused: collective guilt, mass slaughter, torture of prisoners, etc. And yet, Meyer, and his fellow "anti-Bolshevik men", in the name of "anti-Communism" and "Western civilization", wholeheartedly supported these and numerous similar actions--capped by the monstrous war in Vietnam. Do not Meyer and his fellow anti-Bolsheviks have at least as many screams in the night to justify and alibi for, as have the Bolshevik men? In fact, they may end with infinitely more: for Meyer and his confreres look forward almost with enthusiam to a nuclear holocaust against the Communist nations that would annihilate tens, if not hundreds, of millions of human beings. The devastation and suffering caused by nuclear war would bring about so many more "screams in the night" than Communism has ever done as to defy comparison. So are Communists then, unique monsters, unique justifiers of criminality?

If, then, Communist cadres are dehumanized, or brutalized, by their fealty to their organization, or by their justifications of its actions, the same is true--even more so--for other groups and especially other States: for the soldier who is deliberately brutalized by his training to kill unquestioningly at the command of his officers; for the especially brutalized paratroopers; for CIA men and espionage agents, etc. The "anti-Bolshevik" man and his organizations can be--and are--just as brutal, just as inhuman, as the Communist, if not more so. Indeed, if we compare the enormous number of defections from

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the Communist party with the negligible number of defections from the CIA or from the American State, then we can conclude that the training and transformation of the Communist is much less effective than the training and moulding of the anti-Communist patriot. And this is especially true if we consider something which Meyer, in his portrayal of the monolithic world Bolshevik, does not even hint at: the astonishingly rapid breaking up, since the death of Stalin, of the International Communist "monolith", both within and between countries. Where has been the equivalent disintegration and "polycentrism" of the anti-Bolshevik or the American-State cadre?

Apart from political and governmental organizations, other examples of dedication, of absolute organizational loyalty, abound in our society. Innumerable ideological movements, and religious movements, dictate to the lives of their members. The monk or nun must subordinate himself completely to ecclesiastical discipline--which is interpreted as defining the will of God. The Jesuit pledges willingness to obey the Pope in all things whatsoever, to submerge his individuality completely in the Jesuit Order as commanded by the Pope. The priest was obedience. The lives of the Buchmanites--the Moral Rearmament movement--are run totally by the movement itself, to which absolute fealty is pledged. The attitude of the Buchmanite is just as "totalitarian" over its members, just as "moulding" of the new man, as the Communist. An acquaintance of mine, who had been born into the 'cadre' of the Buchmanite Movement, was ordered by her superiors not to go to college, because they decided that she wasn't fit for the move.

Some of the allegedly unique characteristics of the Communist and his "moulding" are not only reflected in numerous large and small organizations, and in all governments, but also in almost any profession. Thus, Meyer describes how the beginning Communist, first revolted at certain aspects of his work, gradually becomes "steel-hardened" to his work and gives up his former scruples. This is supposed to show the unique diabolism of Communist training. But isn't this true of many quite ordinary and undiabolic professions? Doesn't the surgeon, the nurse, first squeamish about the grisly details of their professions, eventually become a "Bolshevik man of steel" about them? Doesn't the worker in a slaughterhouse follow the same "path of training"?

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Throughout the book, Meyer describes in awed, portentous, almost breathless fashion situations which are ordinary, even commonplace, rather than diabolically unique to the Communist movement. One particularly absurd -- almost unconsciously humorous--passage deals with Communists finding that they don't make close friendships outside the Party. "Communists . . . seem to find their really enjoyable recreation in informal, relaxed Party talk: talking shop, post-mortem, anecdotes, reminiscenses, semi-theoretical argument, Party gossip. The drying up of personal connections of depth with the outside world is compensated to a considerable degree by the comradeship that undoubtedly exists in the Party, born of common association . . ." (129). Now Good Heavens! Has Meyer never heard of friendships being formed on the basis of deeply-shared interests? Has he never heard, for example, that musicians, dedicated to music, tend to associate largely with other musicians? Writers with other writers? And don't libertarians tend to form their deepest friendships with other libertarians (if they can be found?) Doesn't Meyer himself largely associate with anti-Communists of the National Review variety? This is all very natural and very common, and there is nothing sinister about it. And yet, as in so many cases throughout the book, Meyer once more treats a common event as the uniquely sinister product or aspect of the "Communist conspiracy".

Another typical piece of diabolism is Meyer's discussion of how the C. P. recruits new members. Each man is carefully screened, his strengths and weaknesses assessed, his susceptibilities played on, etc. His personal friend will be the one to ask him to join, and after he joins he will be greeted in comradely fashion by other Party members. Again, Good Heavens! Consider any group in our society, whether it be a corporation considering hiring an executive, the President selecting someone for a White House appointment, or your local lodge or Kiwanis inviting a member to join. Will he not be screened and considered? Won't his friend be the one to invite him? Won't he then be greeted cordially by his fellow-members? In short, the supposedly sinister tactics of the C. P. are tactics used by almost any group, from government down to the local sewing circle, in treating potential or actual new members or "recruits". What's sinister about that?

Then again, we find that the C. P. particularly hates "renegades", those who have defected from the Party, and whom it suspects will be uniquely anti-Party. But here again, this phenomenon is true of any creed, any organization. Suppose again that a man is a vegetarian,

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part of a weak or a strong vegetarian movement. He does not hate a man who has never become interested in the vegetarian movement: that man is, to the vegetarian, simply ignorant, not yet apprised of the vegetarian truth, not yet raised to "vegetarian consciousness". But let a man join the vegetarian movement, rise high in it, and then desert its ranks and become anti-vegetarian, and hatred for this renegade--the man who has seen the truth and then spurned it--will almost inevitably well up in the ranks of the faithful. This again--while perhaps deplorable--is one of the most natural phenomena in the world. It is present in the Catholic Church, which has hope for the pagan but scorn for the apostate, it is present in every ideological or any other type of movement, it is present in the minds of General Motors men when one of their rank moves to Ford, it is present, even (as the work of Caplow and McGee, The Academic Marketplace, attests) in faculty members of "Siwash College" when one of their colleagues leaves for a job at any other college. His former colleagues somehow feel that he has betrayed them, has betrayed Siwash, and usually have little further to do with him. Again, Communists are simply acting like any other Organization Men or any other ideologists.

Meyer also considers unique and somehow sinister that the Communist, while fighting hard for his point of view within the Party, will stick with the Party and fight for its decision, even when it has decided contrary to his own views. But, once again, this attitude is true of all Organization Men, regardless of the organization. The loyal Democratic Party man remains with his party if his candidate or point of view loses in the primary or in party councils; he works hard for the winning candidate, and then, as cadre Communists are supposed to do, "bides his time" to see if he can make his views prevail later. The government bureaucrat does the same thing in inter-bureaucratic struggles; the general when he argues for his point of view in the General Staff; the corporation executive who wishes to pursue a new policy, etc. This attitude might not always be commendable, but it is hardly sinister or unique to Communists--again, it is almost universal.

We have seen that time and again, imputes sinister attributes unique to Communism, to aspects that are common to many, or even all, organizations, ideologies, or dedicated people. But his error goes deeper than this, for in some cases, he attributes the sinister to qualities that we should consider virtuous or even admirable. For

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example, Meyer describes with some horror that the Communist tries to control his subconscious mind by his conscious, tries to mold his emotions to serve his reason. What in the world is wrong with that? On the contrary, such control, such rationalism, is admirable. That men should be more rational, and have complete mastery over themselves, is an ideal to be sought, and not something to be regarded as a sinister device of "Bolshevik Man".

Similarly, Meyer makes a big to-do of the Communist principle of the "unity of theory and practice", which he claims to be mystical, unique, etc. Yet, on his own evidence, what is this mysterious 'unity of theory and practice'? It is simply the desire to avoid two polar errors: the fashioning of theory which will be arid, sterile, and unrelated to human life; and the acting in day-to-day practice without having that practice guided and moulded by theoretical principles. Again, far from being something sinister, this is a highly admirable doctrine. And it can be applied to any theory which one wants to advance, whether Communist, libertarian, or vegetarian. Thus, again, the cause of vegetarianism is being hampered if vegetarians only study and develop vegetarian theory, with no attempt to agitate for vegetarianism in practice, to recruit new vegetarians, etc. Conversely, the cause of vegetarianism will suffer if vegetarians only act and never study, refine, or advance their theoretical principles--they will inevitably end by betraying or abandoning their own goals. Communists try to avoid this, as any sensible movement should; the difference only is that Communists have thought longer and harder about such problems than most other groups.

In trying to attach a unique, and sinister, quality to the Communists' "unity of theory and practice", Meyer reaches the heights of absurdity by pointing out that Lenin, Stalin, etc. wrote no systematic work, but that their main theoretical writings (Marx even included--except for Das Kapital) were not systematic theory, but intertwined in daily polemical struggles. Meyer says that "Marxism-Leninism has no Summa, no Institutes, etc." Once again, Good Heavens! Doesn't Meyer know that the same was true of the Christian Fathers? St. Augustine, the greatest of the Fathers, wrote no Summa, no theoretical work either; all of his theoretical doctrines were intertwined in polemical and daily struggles (in his organizational work as Bishop of Hippo, in his polemics against heretics, etc.) The same was true of the other Church fathers. It took a thousand years of developing Christian speculation and theology before St. Thomas and others began to write

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their Summas. The Communists have not had a thousand years.

Another admirable virtue which Communists apparently possess and which Frank attacks them for, is that they are taught to have an attitude, a position, on all political events, regardless of where they take place on the globe. They are, in short, taught to think responsibly in politics. What, again, is wrong with that? This is the highest form of political thought: to concern oneself, and to formulate a position, on all important and relevant political events of one's time, and even on events in past ages.

This error of Meyer's is bound up in his deprecation of Communists for trying to integrate all their thought, all their views on the humane and even natural sciences, into one great philosophic system. This aim, far from being sinister or diabolic, can only be considered wholly admirable, and in the best tradition of reason and science. To carve out an architectonic, a system which enables one to hold a consistent and integrated view of all the disciplines of man is a great and noble aim, and a rationalist individualist philosophy can also accomplish this goal. Clearly, it is the goal of science to be able to explain more and more phenomena. What's wrong about the Marxists, contrary to Meyer, is not their aim of an integrated systematic approach to philosophy and its allied subjects, but the fact that this particular system is almost totally wrong. Yet, instead of rejecting the Marxian system only, Meyer attacks system per se. One instance Meyer gives of this is that the Marxist-Leninist considers himself able to instruct the physicist, for example, in the basic philosophic errors of the Principle of Indeterminacy or Uncertainty. Meyer treats this aim as ludicrous, but, on the contrary, the Marxist-Leninist would be right. The principle of indeterminacy is philosophically incorrect (though not necessarily for Marxist-Leninist reasons), and general philosophers are entitled to criticize it. Similarly, aesthetic philosophers are entitled to criticize modern art even though they are not at all artists. This aim of Marxism is simply the old Greek rationalist aim to make philosophy once more the queen of the sciences and of the intellectual disciplines.

Similarly, Meyer considers it sinister that the Communists want to purge their judgments of all "subjectivity" and to render them "objective". What in the world is wrong with that? This has been the aim of every rationalist in the history of the world; the rationalist tries to be scientific

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and objective about arriving at truth, to rise above his own emotions and biasses. This has been generally considered a noble aim, yet Meyer implies it to be vicious and Bolshevik. Objectivity in searching for truth is indeed to be sought, and "subjectivity" spurned; where the Communists go wrong is to identify truth and objectivity not with their own careful judgment of the matter, but in other persons: in the Party. This--the identifying of reason and reality with a specific group of people--is their cardinal error, and not their attempts to be objective and rational.

The injunction of objectivity is also used, in the Communist movement, to assure that one's views on events are guided by rational rather than emotive considerations--a highly commendable position surely. Thus, a man whom I have known for many years, and who professes to be an ardent libertarian, expressed a few years ago his hope that the Freedom Riders be jailed; here is an example, for a libertarian, of non-objective thinking--of allowing his emotional dislike for left-wing Freedom Riders to swamp his libertarian principles. This problem is therefore hardly uniquely Communist, nor is the Communist striving for keeping objective principles in mind anything but commendable (though the content of those principles, of course, is a different matter.)

Again, Meyer considers it rather sinister that Communists are highly concerned with "correct formulation" of position, and are concerned to oppose any "deviations" from this formulation. As he points out, the Communists do this because they realize that "ideas are weapons", and that a slight deviation from fundamental premisses can mean large divergence from final conclusions. But this realization is not sinister, but simply an indication that Communists are serious about ideas, and realize the critical role that ideas play in public affairs--materialists though they may be. Of course, Communists may tend humorlessly to push this concern with correct formulaton to extremes--but probably less than did the innumerable Christian arguments about shadings of meanings of a Greek word, etc. that led to countless heresies, schisms, and even religious wars. Once again, the Communists are neither unique nor necessarily to be condemned for being precise and serious about their ideas.

Another presumably sinister attribute of the Communist is quoted by Meyer: "The basic principle of modern Soviet didactics is the principle of conscious understanding . . . The Bolshevik insists on man's responsi-

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bility for his behavior and on his ability to make his own destiny". (189), Again, what could be more admirable than a striving for consciousness, for rationalism, and for self-responsibility? What could be more individualist, in fact? Of course, the Communist errs when "He follows the Party line because the Party is right' and because he presumably understands why it is right' ", but at least we can commend the Communist for trying to understand rationally why the Party is "right" rather than merely accept orders for the sake of accepting. This puts the Communist far ahead, say, of the soldier--in the American or any other army--who is told to obey orders unquestioningly. Surely, that is a far more brutalizing and dehumanizing way of conducting an organization than is the Communist.

Meyer plunges once more into unconscious humor when, again with portentousness and awe, he describes the Communist as not being emotionally indignant against his enemies but being cool and sober. (73 f.) Meyer admits that, in public agitational speaking, the Communist will work himself into emotional indignation, but that "in private conversation", his attitude, the attitude of the "developed Communist", is "highly sober". Now, again, really! Surely what Meyer is describing is not sinister Machiavellianism but simple maturity! The libertarian, for example, hates the State, particularly the Leviathan State of today. But he does not, if he is mature and sensible, go around frothing at the mouth; his attitude of indignation at the State is so deep-seated that he can afford to be, and will be, sober, cool, even humorous at times, about the whole problem. Again, this is simple maturity, not Communist machination, and does not connote a "new type of man" or "psychosurgery" or anything of the sort.

To turn now from instances where Meyer is attacking Communists for their virtues (responsibility, sobriety, rationalism, etc.) to other instances where he is attacking them for supposedly unique faults which are actually widespread: Meyer speaks, again portentously, of the prevalence of the "our" "they" dichotomy in Communist thinking and conversation. This is supposed to symbolize the depth of Communist alienation from all other people. But again, Good Heavens! This, again, is true of any ideological movement, regardless of what it is. The followers constitute "us" or "our side"; the antagonists "them" and the "other side". How often do libertarians or conservatives, for example, ask: "Which side is he on?" "Has he come over to our side?", etc. I am sure

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that the vegetarian, or the anti-flouridationist, or whatever, holds the same attitudes.

Again, Meyer thinks it strange and somehow diabolic that the Communist divides himself into the cadre and the rank-and-file, who serve as transmission belts for the cadre. Much is made, throughout the book, of this cadre vs. rank-and-file distinction as one of the essential facts of the "moulded" Communist man. But, once again, the distinction between cadre and rank-and-file is true of any organization, ideological or non-ideological. The local Kiwanis club will have inactive, passive rank-and-file members; and it will have a "hard core" -- a cadre -- of active leaders, who will be a minority in relation to the rank-and-file, but who will effectively "run" the rank and file and take the leadership in the organization. This is almost a sociological law of all organization, and not unique with Communists. Whatever the organization or profession, whether it be lodge meeting, Democratic Party, or General Motors, there will be a minority of the more interested and/or more able who will be the cadre leaders to a majority of passive, less able and/or less interested rank-and-file. Again, there is nothing particularly sinister here.

Another instance of absurdity in the book is Meyer's statement that in Marxist party-training schools, economics is called "political economy" (167). Now, put baldly like this, the reader once more sees another sinister aspect of Communism: for here Communists twist economics and make it political: "political economy". Another weight in the scales of supposed evidence of Communist diabolism has been made. But Meyer does not inform the reader that the explanation for this is very simple, and non-sinister. The reason is that the Communists follow the economics of Karl Marx, and Marx wrote at a time when all economics was called "political economy." Hence, the Communists still cleave to the name--just as do the clearly non-sinister Henry Georgists, and for similar reasons. The term "economics" only came in toward the end of the 19th century.

Another favorite indictment of the Communists, and one used by Frank Meyer throughout this book, to demonstrate their unique diabolism, is that Communism is a "conspiracy." How often have we read of the "international Communist conspiracy"! Other socialists are not bad, the cry runs, because they are not "conspirators", whereas Communists

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are. Communists, say Meyer and others, are trained to deceive, they cooperate in secret, etc.

Let us, in the first place, analyze this much-used term "conspiracy". What does it mean? It was introduced into the common law by panicky kings who wanted to stamp out all dissidence and opposition and who called their opposition "conspirators". The law of conspiracy is, as a result, in very bad shape, for it outlaws A and B agreeing to do things together which are perfectly legal for them to do separately. In actuality, "conspiring" is just a "smear" term for doing something in secret and in private. If A and B agree to push C for nomination in the local lodge meeting, and you and I are against C, we can denounce A and B as engaging in "conspiracy". In other words, if you and I agree to do something, it is simple and justifiable private agreement; if other people, whom we dislike, agree to do something, this becomes ipso facto "conspiracy". Let us abandon this loaded term, "conspiracy", and refer to agreements made in private or in secret.

What, then, is wrong with private or secret agreements or actions? (The ends might be bad--such as agreeing to rob a bank--but this is not the fault of the secrecy, but of the end involved. An open, public agreement to rob a bank would be morally just as bad. But we have agreed to prescind from the ends in view--in the case of the Communists it is socialism--and simply consider the means, the form employed by them: in this case, "conspiracy".) There is surely nothing wrong with them; one of the most precious rights of an individual in a free society is privacy, and this includes the right to make private agreements with others, to form secret societies, etc. Attack on privacy and secrecy is an expression of massification and collectivist spirit at its worst and most meddlesome. Yet this spirit has always seen something sinister and diabolic in the secrecy of others: one of the most important political parties in American history was the "Anti-Masonic Party", dedicated to the coercive extermination by the State of the "international Masonic conspiracy"; the Catholic Church and its rites have been denounced as secret and conspiratorial; so have the Knights of Columbus, etc.

Furthermore, what about those "dedicated anti-Communists", the FBI, the CIA, the Army Intelligence, etc.? Are they not trained exclusively in secrecy, and in deception? Do not our espionage agents live by secrecy and

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double-dealing? What of their humanity, and their moral principles?

Furthermore, the Communist Party, believe it or not, is far less secretive than, not only the CIA, but also such approved groups as the Masons or the Knights of Columbus. For the Communists openly publish their views, proclaim their ends,etc. If they are secretive, they are far less so than innumerable secret societies which are considered perfectly appropriate to American life and whom Frank Meyer would not think of denouncing--but which, on his own terms, he should.

Finally, there is good reason for secretiveness in the Communist movement. That is, that a good portion of the time, Communists are either outlawed or in a state of semi-outlawry, harassed by government officials and espionage agents. Certainly, with the Smith and McCarran Acts, etc. this has been true in the United States. Much of the need for secrecy is imposed upon it from outside.

Moreover, all organizations are secretive to some extent: (in the jargon of "hard anti-Communism", they are all partly "open" and partly "underground"). The Americans for Democratic Action issue open resolutions, but they do not bare all their inner deliberations and arguments to public view. And why should they? Neither do Democratic Party leaders bare their deliberations, nor do union leaders, nor do corporation executives. So are they all "conspirators".

Basic to Meyer's analysis of the Communist movement is his view of world Communism as a monolith, with the Politburo of the Soviet Union at its head. Now to the extent that this was true, this was only true during the Stalinist Period of the movement (approximately 1929 to 1948--the date of the defection of Marshal Tito.) Before and after, the Communist movement was never a monolith; disagreements,schisms, etc. were substantive, grave, and open. As early as the 1920's, Mao-tse-tung disobeyed Stalin's advice to coalesce with Chiang-kai-Shek, and took to the hills to form a guerilla army. And since 1948, and especially since 1956, the world Communist movement has clearly been far from a monolith; it is perhaps not coincidental that Meyer's own personal experience in the Party was only in the Stalinist period; but there is still no excuse for him to ignore the last 19 years of extremely important Party history. Tito's split opened up another fissure in the world Communist movement; and, in 1956,

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Khruschev changed the face of the world Communist movement for all time--how? by castigating the errors and and even crimes of Stalin. This attack on Stalin cannot be interpreted as simply another change in "line". For what this meant was that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was openly repudiating its formerly revered leader--in fact, repudiating its own past actions. This means the open rejection of what Frank Meyer claims is the central tenet of every Communist: that the Party is always right. Now that the Party has acknowledged that it, even its central core, can make grievous mistakes, it is impossible for the CP ever to become a monolith again, for every Communist now knows that the Party can be proved wrong, even in its central leadership.

Meyer maintains that the world Communist movement is a monolith run by the Soviet Politburo, yet we have seen strikingly and increasingly in recent years that this is certainly not the case. That Meyer's statements are pure assertion unbacked by convincing evidence is shown, further, by his failure to cite any sources dealing with the Russian or Asian or other non-European Communist parties. And there is another important point vis a vis "Communist man" that Meyer fails to consider. In countries where the Communist movement is out of power, we can be sure that its members are eager, dedicated ideologues. But in countries where Communism is in power, the situation inevitably changes. For this means that the only way to rise in society, to rise above the level of ditch-digger, is to join the Communist party. It is then inevitable that Communist parties in Communist regimes will become heavily infected with the virus of "careerism", "opportunism,", etc., men who will of course spout the slogans, but do so only ritualistically, and who will act increasingly as Russian--or Yugoslavian--or whatnot bureaucrats rather than ideologues. And as time goes on, this process is bound to accelerate. Yet, by omitting this element, Meyer's policy conclusions in relation to Communist countries and their leaders become totally misleading.

We must conclude that Frank Meyer has not in the least established his thesis: that his discussion distorts the picture, and that one cannot concur in the special diabolism of the Communist organization. But if that is true, then the only thing really wrong about the Communists is their end: socialism, and this is an end pursued by a great many other people, people who are far more influential

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in the direction of socialism or statism than is the negligible CPUSA.

If the Communist is not uniquely disbolic, then what is he? I think we can pretty well summarize the Communist by saying that he is, in form, structure, and means: an Intellectual Organization Man, and his end is socialism, of the proletarian-Marxian variety. Like all other Organization Men, he is devotedly loyal to his organization, in this case his Party. In the ranking of organizations and their men, it is fair to say that he is more subservient and dehumanized than a General Motors executive, but far less subservient and brutalized than a soldier, a paratrooper, or an agent of the CIA. If he rationalizes and justifies brutality, then so do the members and defenders of every State. He is far more independent than the soldier, paratrooper, or CIA man, as witness the numerous schisms, defections, etc. that have taken place in Communist ranks, as compared to the scarcity of mutinies in the ranks of the armed forces. The Communist has many admirable qualities which other people might well emulate: the striving to be rational and objective, the striving to integrate all of man's knowledge and social philosophy into one great philosophic system, the wish to be serious and responsible, the striving for an ideal which (he believes) will bring about a Paradise on earth for the human race. He has two major errors: one is that the philosophical system that he has adopted, Marxism, is incorrect; and, as a consequence, that his goal of socialism is a grave error. But we have seen that the goal (socialism) must be ruled out of this discussion, because there are a great many socialists, and Communists then become no worse than any of the others. His second error is that he is an Organization Man: that he tends to place the locus of science, or reason, or reality, in other persons: i.e., in the ones who constitute the leadership of his organization. But while this is unfortunate, we have seen that this is a trait which the Communist shares with all too many millions of others today, in innumerable organizations of all types throughout the world. What we see here is not the compulsory bondage of an individual to the State, but the voluntary bondage of an individual to some external Orgnization. It is, indeed, incumbent on individualists and libertarians to give profound attention to this entire problem; for while we have thought and written a great deal about the State, we have done little to consider the problem of the individual vis a vis organizations.

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Since there are Organization Men everywhere, and since the Communists are far better individualists than Army officers, etc., we must conclude that Communists are not uniquely diabolic, that the main thing wrong with them is their end goal; but that this is a goal which they share with much more respectable groups, groups whom few would attack as diabolic.

Finally, it is important to note a disquieting passage or two which indicates that one reason that Meyer is so fiercely opposed to Communism may be that it, in turn, is opposed to the State (or, at least, to the non-Communist State.) Thus, Meyer, in the course of his anti-Communist phillipic, says:

> Previously, the policeman on the corner has been for him, as for most Americans or Englishmen, a neutral symbol at the worst, at the best a source of information and ultimate protection against robbers and other malefactors. Now he is transformed into an immediate symbol of danger, an agent of the enemy, the bourgeois state, with whom one's only potential relations are those of warfare. An alienation from the mores of the society is being artificially created. . . Through theory, through atmosphere, through interpreted experience in demonstration or picket line, the sense of community with the nation is shattered. Very concretely, the idea of a commonwealth within the established commonwealth, and in bitter battle with it, is instilled. (127-128)

Let us note this passage very carefully. For what Meyer is doing is to identify "the society", "the nation", and "the commonwealth" with the State--with the "cop on the corner." Now this is the grievous error that has been made by every writer who has opposed liberty: this identification of the public, of the citizenry, with the State apparatus. It does not salvage Meyer's position to add his wish that the State be "the limited government of a constitutional republic"; the damage is done. (Also, see page 68, where Meyer is opposing the Communist view of the State as pure force--which, of course, is precisely what the State is.) It is unfortunate, but perhaps not astonishing, that Frank Meyer should reveal a deep-rooted and

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fundamental statism in his political philosophy; for it is almost impossible to agitate for the State to kill Communists throughout the world without adopting statism at the root of one's social philosophy.

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VIETNAM:
Teach-Ins

Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh, eds., Teach-Ins: U.S.A., Reports, Opinions, Documents, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 349 pp., $1.95.

By Leonard P. Liggio

The first teach-in developed at the University of Michigan. It was held on March 24, 1965 in response to the sustained bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the US government. This teach-in was organized by the students and faculty at the University of Michigan and Professor Anatol Rapoport, one of the organizers, has presented this description of it:

> The first teach-in was a demonstration, not a debate. To be sure, the meeting had the format of academic discourse, and, needless to say, the whole gamut of opinon found expression in the night-long discussions. But there was no question about the basis of discussion. The point of departure was our conviction that the present U. S. policy in Southeast Asia was dangerous, ineffective, illegal, and immoral. No Government spokesman and no apologist for the Administration's policy appeared on the "faculty" of the "Free University of Michigan." Whatever opposition was voiced was directed at us from the floor, not from among us. To the critics of this procedure we replied that the Administration had its own channels of communication and its own apparatus of influence. Our task was to establish a counterforce to the engineering of consent.

The "Free University of Michigan's" "faculty" ranged from such long standing critics of US foreign policy as Professor Kenneth Boulding, to such then unrecognized commentators as Carl Oglesby. Kenneth Boulding has summarized the motivation of the teach-in as follows:

> It began as a movement of pure protest and outrage. The motivations which inspired it were no doubt

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various. They included a genuine fear of escalation into nuclear warfare; they included also a sense of moral outrage at the use of such things as napalm and the "lazy dog," and the appalling sufferings which we are imposing on the Vietnamese in the supposed name of freedom and democracy.

Professor Boulding has suggested the illusions that were revealed in the teach-ins. Often there were pleas for the US to resume a peaceful role in the world, as though the US government has not been an aggressor throughout its history. This meant that the teach-in needed to instruct the students, i. e., faculty and students, in the reality of American history and in the reality of aggression, neither of which is taught in American universities. As Professor Boulding said: "We are not, and never have been, a peace-loving nation; we are not only ruthless and bloody but we feel no shame about it." Similarly, Professor Christopher Lasch's commentary on the teach-ins indicates the potential role of education which has been rejected by the universities and its professors:

> The real subject that needs to be "taught" is the history of the Cold War and of the relation of the American Left to Communism. The Left needs to reconsider its own history, as a patient therapeutically reconstructs his past . . . These are subjects --as distinguished from "alternatives" in Vietnam - worth teaching. Until the teach-ins begin to teach, they will be politically useless and intellectually boring. It will be interesting to see whether the failures of higher education - the confusion of education with expertise, the idea that students are a needless obstacle to "research" - will now repeat themselves in the political agitation to which teachers find themselves so unexpectedly committed.

The relationship of the origins of the Cold War and the failure of the American Left are really the same subject in that the ability of Liberal Corporatism, centered in the New Deal-Fair Deal, to co-opt the American Left and make it the spokesman of US imperialism against domestic and foreign anti-imperialists insured the existence of the Cold War - the modern expression of US imperialism. Lasch notes:

> Things would be different if the American Left had not long ago committed itself to outdo the Right in its anti-Communist zeal; but, once the Left itself

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accepted anti-Communism as the sine qua non of political respectability, it became the prisoner of its own immediate success, surviving the postwar hysteria only to find that hysteria had become a permanent feature of the political scene.

The postwar hysteria resulted from the prewar hysteria which the Left engendered to aid US imperialism's intervention in World War II. The teach-ins provided a beginning for exposing the limited range of difference that has passed for a left or a right in America - that both have alternatively merely been instruments for co-option by Liberal Corporatism. Such a role is revealed, for example, in a comment on the teach-ins by the new-rightist, Russell Kirk: "Fancy Dr. Staughton Lynd, or a professor of the Birchite persuasion, as Secretary of State." What Kirk indicates is not merely the similarity of the anti-Establishmentism of the New Left and the Birchites, but also the frequent identity of their criticisms and conclusions, especially their neo-isolationist analysis of US imperialism.

Echoes of the earlier domestic anti-imperialist critiques were to be found from the beginning of the teach-ins at Michigan, and increased with the constant assertion by supporters of US imperialism in Vietnam that the domestic opposition was a resurgence of the American isolationism which opposed US aggression in 1898, 1917, 1941 and 1950. At the Michigan teach-in, Arthur Waskow, of the Institute for Policy Studies, appears to have initiated the insight when he raised the cry: "stop neo-isolationism." Perhaps as a historian he recognized the essentially Left and revolutionary potentialities of isolationism - the domestic opposition to US imperialism. Liberal Corporatism requires a range of imperialist instruments to achieve its goals, but the most important over the long-run has been the foreign aid program. The conservatives in the Liberal Corporatist Establishment - Fulbright, Kennedy, Morse, etc. - wish to rely on the tried and proven mechanism of imperialism, foreign aid (military and economic), rather than on the aggressive forward strategies of Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Rostow, etc., which raises threats to the existing exploitative system. Arthur Schlesigner, Jr., in his speech to the National Teach-in, quoted Senator Robert Kennedy to emphasize the crucial role of increased foreign aid to achieve the desired objectives of US imperialism, especially in Vietnam. Similarly, Arthur Waskow, to emphasize his opposition to the American neo-isolationism of the New

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Left, proposes increased expenditure for the major instrument of US imperialism, foreign aid. Waskow's Michigan teach-in attack on neo-isolationism summarized that opposition to US imperialism as follows:

> There are some Americans who have responded to their own horror over the means we are using in Vietnam by denouncing the use of any means at all, who have responded to the difficulties we have discovered in the way of accomplishing our official noble ends in the underdeveloped world by condemning those ends as irrelevant to, or undesirable for, the underdeveloped world. They have responded to the new American arrogance with what, at first glance, looks like a new American humility: the humility that says we have nothing useful to offer the world.

From the University of Michigan the teach-ins spread to many campuses and some had important repercussions by raising a number of fundamental issues which had remained unresolved beneath the surface of the previously unexamined American society . For example, th teach-in organized on April 23, 1965 by the Rutgers University SDS chapter played the role of raising such issues for the university as well as for the state's electorate. At the teach-in history professor Eugene Genovese declared: "I do not fear or regret the impending Vietcong victory in Vietnam. I welcome it." This statement as well as its repetition by political science professor James Mellen of Drew University, at a Rutgers teach-in in September, bcame the major issue in the New Jersey gubernatorial campaign; Gov. Hughes was re-elected on his support for academic freedom while Professors Genovese and Mellen were ultimately removed from their academic posts by the subtle means used by university administrators.

The National Teach-in held in Washington, May 15, 1965 departed from the basic nature of the teach-ins, for it was developed and operated in cooperation with the Administration in order to give respectability and distribution to the Administration's postion among the uncommitted. Professor William Appleman Williams, who addressed the National Teach-in, noted the ability of the Administration to manipulate it so that "Deutscher's assault on the assumptions of American policy, and Morgenthau's laying bare the dangerous unreality of officialdom's so-called realism" were blunted. (It is unfortunate that Isaac Deutscher's address was not able to be included in Teach-

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ins: U. S. A.) Williams indicates that the failure of the National Teach-in compared to the teach-in movement lay in the absence of students in determining its activities. Williams says:

> The first and crucial thing to understand is that the students largely supplied the initiative and power behind the entire movement . . .
> They are young men and women who are intelligent and perceptive enough to learn from their elders without making all the same mistakes. They have had enough of hipsterism as well as of the jet-set, and of the Old Left as well as of the Establishment. And they are aware that emancipation involves men as well as women, and that it concerns something beyond changing patterns of sexual behavior and beyond the freedom and the opportunity to hustle their wares in the marketplace.
> They are morally committed to the proposition that the American system must treat people as people, and that the system must be changed if that is necessary to achieve that objective. They are deeply angry about the double standard of morality they constantly experience.

In contrast to the students, the faculty who were the organizers of the National Teach-in were, according to Joan Scott's perceptive observation, "confused about whether they loved the existing system or the enduring principle of American democracy."

The most productive teach-in was the Berkeley Teach-in (May 21-22) which led to major political activities in succeeding months. It was addressed by the most significant American critics of US aggression in Vietnam as well as by international figures such as Isaac Deutscher and Bertrand Russell (by tape). Professor Staughton Lynd's speech contained the important contribution to radical politics in America that coalition politics "means coalition with the Marines." Lynd concluded his speech with a call for a revolutionary analysis of the meaning of imperialist war for American society. He said to the government of the United States:

> And if you are worried that the natives all over the world are restless, we want you to know that the natives here at home are restless too, and maybe there should be a contingency plan to keep some of the Marines here to deal with us.

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From this there developed the International Days of Protest which were the response to the activity and leadership for the Berkeley teach-in group. Focusing on the support of American opposition to US imperialism, international teach-ins were organized in major world capitals. A teach-in against US aggression in Vietnam was held at the University of Puerto Rico in which the independence movement of Puerto Rico drew the parallel between "Puerto Rico's sturggle for liberation and that of the Vietnamese people." From London to Tokyo (where recently-elected SDS president Carl Oglesby spoke) the response to the Berkeley group's call for international solidarity with the American anti-imperialist movement contributed to the education of the radical movements in many countries. In the Paris teach-in an orthodox Marxist speaker was "reminded that the French working class, largely led by the Communist Party, had never struck for peace in Algeria; he may have begun to understand what a real teach-in might be: the examination of assumptions - even one's own."

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VIETNAM

And The Republicans

The War In Vietnam. The Text of the Controversial Republican White Paper Prepared by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1967, 62 pp., $1.00.

By Leonard P. Liggio

> Early in this staff study it is stated:
> America, no matter how pure its motives, cannot overcome the weight of history insofar as the Vietnamese look at it. In short, their memory of history is what we must learn to deal with, not our concept of it.

And in its conclusions, it declares:

> In short, we Americans cannot simply go to Asia, wipe the slate clean, and say to them, "This is how it shall be." The Vietnamese have their own view of nationalism, quite different from ours, the Vietnamese Communists identify with it, and it renders our involvement immeasurably difficult.

The advantage of the Republicans' study is that it seeks to understand the realities both of the recent history of the Vietnamese people and of the present political situation. Against these facts the Republicans re-examine the U. S. intervention in Vietnam.

The background indicates to the Republicans that the "most crucial moments" came at the end of the Second World War.[1] Ho Chi Minh's leadership brought independence to Vietnam on September 2, 1945, but, based on the decision of the Anglo-Soviet-American Potsdam conference, allied forces under a British general restored the colonial rule of the De Gaulle government in southern Vietnam. "The consequences of this decision are with us today."

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While completely condemning the U. S. - supported French aggression, the Republican study merely touches on the original U. S. official involvement in Vietnam - its recognition of the puppet Saigon government in February 1950. It refuses to face the fact that this recognition was intimately involved in U. S. hostility to the newly established Peoples's Republic of China. Throughout the study the relationship of Vietnam to overall U. S. policy, especially to China policy, is neglected as though the Vietnam involvement were an isolated mistake rather than the most obvious aspect of a single foreign policy. Thus, when in mid-January 1950, the Soviet Union objected to the presence of the Chiang delegate in the Security Council, the U.S., supported by France, vetoed the seating of the delegation of the People's Republic of China; China recognized Ho Chi Minh's government, the U. S., to compensate France, recognized the Saigon regime, and the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council until after the beginning of the Korean war six months later. Again, regarding Truman's intervention in Korea, the Republicans fail to indicate an overall policy in the simultaneous introduction of American forces at the three traditional invasion routes against China: Korea, the Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Taiwan, and the dispatch of American 'advisers' to Vietnam. Nor do they recall the strong Republican opposition to this policy led by Senator Robert Taft. Taft declared:

> I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the Continent of Asia, which, of course, included China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war on the Continent of Asia that it would bring about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win.
> If the President can intervene in Korea without congressional approval, we can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.

Understandably, the Republicans are proud of the Eisenhower administration's responsible reaction to the Vietnam crisis of 1954.

President Eisenhower was willing to cash in his chips in 1954, no matter how humiliating it might be to admit we had backed a loser, rather than throw good blood after bad money. In other words, he realized the application of military power could not resolve a hopeless political situation in Vietnam.

Eisenhower's American-centered decision for non-intervention in Vietnam contributed to the famous accusation from

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careless observers that he was a "conscious agent of communism."

The White Paper's analysis of the Geneva conference of 1954 suggests that US imperialism's defining of all opposition to it as Communist may rest less in ignorance than in conscious policy. By narrowing the alternatives for national liberation struggles in this way, US imperialism insures receiving the benefit of the accomodating influence of the major Communist powers in gaining a negotiated approach to end the struggle and in regaining at the conference table what imperialism lost on the battlefield.

> The Soviet Union . . . pressured Ho Chi Minh to make concessions to France which Ho did not feel were justified. Since the Vietminh controlled three-quarters of all Vietnam, Ho was confident he could quickly capture the rest. . . Communist China, at the time, was trying to present a more moderate image to the world and was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in forcing Ho Chi Minh to ease his demands. . . . France emerged from the Conference having salvaged at the negotiating table much of which she had lost on the battlefield. Ho Chi Minh agreed to pull Vietminh forces out of South Vietnam, which they largely controlled, back above the 17th parallel.

This policy of US imperialism further limits the effectiveness of successful liberation movements by narrowing the alternatives for development in the future as well as by reducing the meaningful responses to US imperialism's policies.

The Republican study emphasizes that the Geneva Agreement did not make the 17th parallel a permanent boundary and that elections were required in two years. However, the Republicans attempt to limit the responsibility of the Dulles policy for undermining the Geneva Agreement by placing the blame on Diem. Diem's actions in Vietnam were a phase of U. S. policy in Asia set by Dulles by creating SEATO in September 1954, less than two months after the Geneva conference, and by the U. S. letter to Diem of October 23, 1954 which had been dictated by a Thai represenative. By concentrating upon Diem's actions, however, the Republicans come to present an accurate description of the development of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The study notes that the guerrilla activity began in 1957 as a result of Diem's refusal to hold the 1956

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elections provided for at Geneva. This opposition was intensified when Diem replaced the local village chiefs with Saigon appointees who naturally became the objects of local "terrorism," i.e., popular justice.

The Republican statement, in its attempts to shift blame from bi-partisan US imperialism to the Democratic administration elected in November, 1960, fails to note the importance of that election for the Vietnamese. Diem was so closely identified with the Republican administration that its defeat by the Democrats led the anti-Diem opposition to revolt against Diem, on November 11, 1960. The Kennedy administration, however, was to support Diem as strongly as the Eisenhower administration. Meanwhile, as a result of the unsuccessful revolt of the Saigon military and political leaders supported by the paratroop forces, the only effective opposition to the US-puppet regime was now the guerrilla forces, and "in December 1960, the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) was formed by militant South Vietnamese insurgents."

Challenging the State Department assumptions that the NLF is controlled by the Hanoi government, the Republicans raise a controversial issue for future events in Vietnam. Either there will be a complete national liberation struggle without compromises with American imperialism or, due to pressures within the socialist camp, there will be an opportunity for new manipulations by American imperialism. The Republicans say:

> It should be noted that the NLF has been southern oriented. Forty of their senior leaders were native South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese Communists have, in the past, found Hanoi quite willing to enter into agreements at the expense of the South Vietnamese whether Communist or not. Examples: . . . Three, the Geneva Agreements of July 1954, left the south under control of the Diem government for at least 2 more years - this when most of the south was already under Communist control. Four, thereafter, neither Hanoi nor Peking, nor Moscow made strong representations against dropping elections in 1956, in effect confirming Diem's control and leaving the South Vietnamese Communists out in the cold. All of which is a reminder to the South Vietnamese Communists that North Vietnam has separate in-

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terests, and has not in the past been the most reliable of allies.

Besides this must be placed the Four Points of the North Vietnam government of April 13, 1965, quoted by the Republicans, including point three: "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference."

To emphasize the qualitative change of the U. S. intervention under Kennedy the study notes that Kennedy announced a crisis in Southeast Asia in May 1961. "President Kennedy reverted to old fashioned gunboat diplomacy and sent an aircraft carrier to demonstrate off Haiphong." American troops were landed in Thailand, special forces units were sent to South Vietnam, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson went to Saigon to affirm the U. S. Vietnam policy. Beginning with China's request of February 24, 1962 and General De Gaulle's of August, 1963, both rejected by the Kennedy administration, and the initiatives of U Thant to the Johnson administration in 1963 and 1964, the Republicans detail the consistent refusal to seek peace by the U. S. government, and conclude that by December 1963 Johnson had made his choice: "The President now set the goal as military victory." Following the assumption of their posts in Saigon in July 1964 by Generals Westmoreland and Taylor, the President received full powers in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, sponsored by Senator William Fulbright. The study states: "The series of events leading to the resolution began with a July 30th naval raid on North Vietnamese island radar and naval installations." By early August, the U. S. escalated the war by air attacks on North Vietnam. Ten thousand dead, fifty thousand wounded and several thousand lost aircraft later the Republicans noted: "Yet at the beginning of April 1967, the United States and South Vietnamese were able to claim control over fewer villages and hamlets than in 1962."

The single substantive proposal in the Republican study is that the United States should not be engaged in a land war on the Asian continent. While, if rigorously applied, the proposal would be a positive contribution, it does not deal with the most important, the most basic issue which underlies the Vietnam war: will the United States accept without any kind of intervention the revolutions which will be undertaken against foreign and domestic exploitation

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by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America? A political party which dodges that fundamental question lacks a future.

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ISOLATIONISM RECONSIDERED

Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966.

By Leonard P. Liggio

It must be stated at the outset that Jonas' work is a disappointment. Like so much recently published scholarship it is superficial. For the sake of general reader interest the material has not been treated with the exhaustive consideration that the topic deserves. There is a great deal of important material that is absent. Nevertheless, Jonas' book is clearly a major break-through. He has moved the consideration of the topic to the level of realism and responsibility from the general immaturity and prejudice which heretofore characterized the discussion of Isolationism. Despite his failure to understand or analyze his topic, Jonas' methodology has accepted Isolationism as a serious approach to world affairs. This will make it possible for scholars to fulfill what Jonas has neglected: an understanding and relevant analysis of the domestic phase of the opposition to twentieth century American imperialism, the reasons for its development and the causes of its ultimate failures.

Jonas indicates how Isolationism is rooted in the events of the American past. Specifically, the past was the First World War - its origins, the American intervention, and its consequences in the post-war political and economic systems. Historical Revisionism, Jonas emphasizes, undermined the official myths of the causation of the war and by a realistic analysis of the data explained the origins of the war and the American intervention, as well as the political and economic crisis of the post-war world. The first general critique was made by Albert Jay Nock in the Freeman. During the war Nock's editorial in the Nation (September, 1918) was singled out for seizure by the government for his analysis of the trade union move-

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ment as an instrument of American imperialism. The outstanding social scientist, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, by his emphasis upon the economic causation for the American intervention in the First World War, opened a new field of research into the role of American banking and corporate interests in foreign policy: for example, C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought; George Seldes, Iron, Blood and Profits; and Frank C. Hanighen and H. C. Engelbrecht, Merchants of Death. Harry Elmer Barnes noted in his introduction to Merchants of Death that "through their pressure to put the United States into the War these bankers brought about the results which have well nigh wrecked the contemporary world."

Jonas devotes a chapter to the Isolationist concentration upon the economic causes of international crisis. "The isolationist argument was coherent, logical, and self-contained: nations go to war for territorial gain or economic advantage." The contribution of Historical Revisionism, according to Jonas, was to give Isolationism a general doctrine of economic causation for political events. The works of Scott Nearing, Harry Elmer Barnes and Marine Major General Smedley D. Butler were particularly important. This general doctrine was applied to the analysis of twentieth century American political policy, foreign and domestic. There was the clear recognition that American imperialism was totally enmeshed in the overall world economic system. Charles Beard concluded that "powerful economic and political personalities seeking to avoid one domestic crisis after another by extending credits to the Allies, finally induced President Wilson to avoid an immediate economic collapse by leading this country into war." From this, isolationists understood that the major banks and corporations, according to Jonas, "Were among the leading supporters of a foreign policy designed to safeguard America's overseas economic interests. The line of action they favored risked more general entanglement in European and Asian affairs ... meddling in world affairs merely insured profits for bankers and businessmen who were the chief beneficiaries, and therefore its chief advocates."

However, the nature of imperialism was clearly seen by only a few isolationists, even as events moved toward the Second Imperialist War. Quincy Howe in England Expects Every American To Do His Duty said that "the greatest Empire on earth and the world's strongest nation will be putting their combined support behind the status quo everywhere." Senator Burton K. Wheeler wrote to

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Oswald Garrison Villard: "All of this talk about lining up with England and France to stop Fascism, by some radicals as well as conservatives . . . might possibly indicate that we were fighting over the colonies in Africa." But, the very terms "by some radicals as well as conservatives" indicates the incomplete nature of the analysis which was made of the system. Jonas, not unlike most other commentators on American foreign policy, fails to begin with the dominant feature of the twentieth century - imperialism. It is imperialism that must define all political forces in each country in the twentieth century; this is how left/right categories should be divided since that is how they divide objectively. Domestic policy is at best secondary compared to foreign policy - imperialism and anti-imperialism. The fact that in the United States almost all the political figures described their own political positions in the superficial terms of domestic rather than foreign policy encouraged the confusions in actual politics as well as in historical analysis. There is a single policy of American imperialism which has to do with the organization of the single domestic-international economy. There have been a number of works which clarify this issue: primarily the overall analysis of William Appleman Williams, and more recently the analysis of the pre-First World War period by Gabriel Kolko, the post-First World War era by Murray N. Rothbard, and the pre-Second World War period by Lloyd Gardner. These authorities indicate that the main thrust for government economic intervention domestically and internationally were and are the banking and related corporate interests, supported by intellectuals and journalists; these have been the conservatives. Those Americans opposed to imperialism were united on the view that interventions were for the benefit of the special interests, and differed only over whether the existing political institutions were sufficient to prevent or overthrow these interventions. The events of a quarter century have demonstrated the weakness of the analysis of those who considered the American Constitution and the party system as a bulwark against special interest. That this should have been believed at all is surprising considering the contributions destroying those myths by the New Historians, Charles Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, etc. "By rejecting the traditional view of America's uniqueness," Jonas says of Beard, "and emphasizing the principle of economic causation, he was, at least by implication, pointing to the universality of the American experience and to its close relationship to Eruopean ideas and events."

As Jonas indicates, the major isolationist intellectuals

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were Charles Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Albert J. Nock, Oswald Garrison Villard, Robert M. Hutchins and Norman Thomas. To name them, is to indicate that, except perhaps for Hutchins, Isolationism was a radical or left ideology. Isolationist politicians were also classified on the left, stemming as they did from the Populist Progressivism of the Midwest Republicans. Jonas notes that "the affinity between the tenets of Isolationism and the presuppositions underlying various forms of agrarian radicalism colored the Midwestern response to the wars in Europe and Asia." Gerald Nye fought against the Republican administrations of the 1920s, especially as an investigator of special interest relationships to the government. In 1934 the Nye committee launched investigations of the role of pro-war banking and business interests in determining foreign policy. Nye characterized the major New Deal legislation, NIRA, "as a bird of prey on the masses" which "encouraged monopoly." Borah opposed corporate influences in government as well as most Republican presidents and presidential candidates and opposed major New Deal measures as favorable to the corporatist interests. As chairman of the foreign relations committee (1925-33) he was the major advocate of recognition of the Soviet Union. Borah criticized the Central American interventions by the US as well as the interventions in China, especially the Hoover-Stimson policies.

In a very important analysis, "The Left and the Right," Jonas presents the seemingly conflicting viewpoints which unified in Isolationism. As traditional Isolationism is radical, the major question is how Isolationism has come to be considered a conservative position. Due to the cooption of most radicals by New Deal corporatism, the radicals who refused to betray the cause were then castigated as "reactionary", which label became a self-fulfilling prophecy when these radicals, barred from their former publishing outlets, found that only the publications with a conservative background would publish their radical writings on foreign policy. The New Deal corporatist system had been declared to be "radical" and the radical opponents of that system and its imperialist foreign policy were then declared to be "reactionary." It was in the wake of this development that the America First Committee was organized; that it was conservative was understandable once the radicals had been betrayed and abandoned. Many radicals, such as Villard, Beard and Barnes, cooperated with America First but never fully integrated with it; radical isolatisinism was missing from the American political scene and these people therefore remained iso-

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lated: welcomed by the conservatives but hardly similar to them. In general, they found the conservatives lacking not merely on domestic issues, but on the basic issues of foreign policy and the tactics to be used.

The conservatives tended to take essentially moderate positions and to pursue very weak, "respectable," tactics. America First limited itself to influencing public opinion by publications, advertisements and rallies, but eschewed marches on Washington as being too extreme (!) and an embarassment to the political opposition for which they operated as an auxiliary. Ultimately, America First considered entering politics directly as a new political force for peace, but this suggestion led to quick resignations by those traditionally connected to the major parties, not an unhealthy, though a too-long delayed, development. This weakness in tactics was partly caused by the moderation of the positions taken. Lacking any radical isolationist movement to spur them, they developed a defensive foreign policy stance. There was no attack on militarism, but rather an emphasis upon rearmament and preparedness. There was no clear critique of American imperialism due to the leadership role of people with imperialist interests, especially in Latin America. There was no clear repudiation of conscription, but a neutrality on this question which permitted the selective service renewal to pass by a single vote in the House in September, 1941. Had there been a truly radical isolationist movement in the United States, America First would have taken a much stronger stand on some of these issues. The Washington and New York chapters of America First had the advantage of traditional, i. e. radical, Isolationism in their leadership. In New York, the chapter was headed by John T. Flynn, premier radical journalist and investigator of the banking and munitions interests. Flynn made the New York chapter a strong voice of radical anti-imperialism.

A major aspect of Jonas' analysis of Isolationism is to emphasize the importance of the international law strain in that position. He identifies such legislators as Senators Borah and Johnson and Representative Fish as well as the international lawyers, John Bassett Moore and Edwin M. Borchard. They had doubts about the successive neutrality bills. Borah strongly opposed the concept of embargoes which would fulfill the League of Nations' system of economic sanctions against those seeking to change the imperialist status quo. Borah, Johnson, Fish, Moore and Borchard refused to support discretionary powers for the president as that would permit the president to provoke

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war. As embargoes would support the League and aid one of the belligerents, Borah and others preferred to relie on "international law to keep American commerce within the accepted standards of neutral behavior." The Roosevelt administration placed an embargo on arms shipments to Spain during the Civil War although the act applied only to wars between states. In similar situations, the US had maintained normal relations with the government while not trading with the rebel forces; any placing of the government and the rebels on the same par was a form of recognition. The rebels in Spain were supplied by Germany and Italy, while England and France embargoed trade with both rivals, effectively depriving the Spanish government of trade while not disturbing the army rebels. Nye suggested that the New Deal had consistently applied the neutrality legislation to the benefit of the fascists. Hamilton Fish agreed with this view. Nye took the lead in the Senate in an attempt to prevent the administration's discriminatory measures against the Spanish Republic. Nye especially objected to the proposal to prohibit the export of medical supplies.

The summer of 1940 was a crucial point for American Isolationism. In May, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was organized. By July, the major periodicals supporting Isolationism had changed sides; Common Sense, the New Republic which dropped John T. Flynn, and the Nation which dropped Oswald Garrison Villard. Soon after, the America First Committee was founded. While the radical intellectuals continued to write about the meaning of the war, the America First Committee tended to pursue different lines of analysis. Yet, a radical position continued to be articulated. Hugh Johnson said that the sole aim of the war was the British government's desire to "maintain her dominant Empire position with her own kinsmen and also over black, brown and yellow conquered and subject peoples in three continents." Senator Nye reminded Americans of the "other Britain" which was the "very acme of reaction, imperialism and exploitation." The Socialist party's national convention in New York in April 1940 reaffirmed its commitment to Isolationism and its foreign policy resolution, read into the Congressional Record by Hamilton Fish, declared that the Allies had "no purpose of overthrowing fascism except to replace it by a more desperate and brutal government, if need be, that would crush the economic demands of the German workers, and leave England and France free to pursue their star of profit."

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The treatment of the isolationist analysis of US Far Eastern policy is limited in Jonas' work. But the US intervention in the war was the result of events centering in the Far East, and it was that intervention that Jonas feels ended the isolationist position. Yet, the suggested failure of isolationists to be concerned with the Far East is not explained or analyzed. Actually, there was a strong isolationist analysis of the Far East. Ralph Townsend, editor of Scribner's Commentator, centered his critiques on the New Deal's attempts "to make Americanism mean support for Chiang Kai-shek." Similarly, Norman Thomas was critical of "the Chinese dictator Chiang." Senator Borah was a close observer of Asian affairs and frequently criticized the Chiang regime as a front for Chinese and Anglo-American corporate interests. In essence, opposition to the Chiang regime represents a distinguishing mark of Isolationism.

Thus, Jonas's book joins the recent works of Wayne Cole and James J. Martin in providing, for the first time, scholarly insight into the much-neglected phenomenon of Isolationism before World War II. But much more needs to be done in exploring the pathways blazoned by these men.

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LETTERS...

ALMS FOR THE AGED!

Opponents of Social Security and Medicare are often unthinkingly accused of cruelty to old people. A good answer to any such charge may be given in the form of a proposal for legislation -- namely, that when an individual reaches the age of 65 the government refund to him, in lump sum and with interest, every cent it has taken from him through taxation during his lifetime. In addition to correctly fixing the blame for the poverty which many old people suffer in this society, this program has the advantage of exposing the welfare statists for the pikers they really are.

Once this legislation is passed, backers of the program can begin pushing to extend the coverage to include younger people -- also demanding that the amount be increased to compensate for losses in purchasing power due to inflation. Eventually the law can be expanded to include everyone and its execution can be simplified by doing away with taxation altogether.

Then, if the government will just stop printing and minting worthless money and thus causing inflation, alms for the aged will nevermore be needed.

Kerry Thornley*

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